Digital Commons @ CIIS
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies Advance Publication Archive

2019

Sexual Consent as Transcendence: A
Phenomenological Understanding
Mark A. Levand
Nicolle Zapien

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/advance-archive
Part of the Philosophy Commons, Religion Commons, and the Transpersonal Psychology
Commons

Sexual Consent as Transcendence:
A Phenomenological Understanding
Mark A. Levand

Widener University
Chester, PA, USA

Nicolle Zapien

California Institute of Integral Studies
San Francisco, CA, USA

Consent to sex is a topic of much research, particularly with the goal of optimizing
sex education for youth, college students, and military service personnel. Sex
educators have tended to err on the side of clear and concise definitions of consent
for ease of instruction. However, the sexual science literature has steadily shown
that the navigation of consent to sexuality activity is much more nuanced, situated
and contextual. When consent is conceptualized as a yes or no answer to particular
sexual acts or sexual activity altogether, it overlooks the dynamic nature of how
people experience consenting. This article examines consent in the sexual science
research literature and then considers these findings through the lens of some of the
contributions of phenomenological philosophy. We then discuss the experience
of consent as a dialogic process that can lead to moments of transcendence of the
self and deep reverence for the other, despite some moments of lack of clarity or
ambiguity within the same sexual act.
Keywords: sexuality, consent, sexual consent, relationality, embodiment,
transcendence, temporality, Merleau-Ponty, Martin Buber, I-Thou
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onsent is an important construct in the
sexual science discourse. It is one of the
defining characteristics of healthy and
legal sexual activity, as distinct from the various
categories of pathological, criminal, and socially
or relationally problematic sexual behavior (APA,
2013; Department of Justice, 2017). Concretely
defining consent in the context of sexuality in
practice, however, has been, and continues
to be, challenging and elusive. Current legal
definitions are dependent on several other terms,
not all of which have meanings that are universally
understood. Definitions of consent use words that
can have subjective meanings such as: Capacity
to consent; freedom from coercion; and, mutually
understood agreement to engage in a sexual act
(Department of Justice, 2017; Rape Abuse and
Incest National Network, 2018). When consent is
applied and interpreted in legal discourse, it is often
not without problems, lack of clarity, and significant
consequence (Busch & MacGregor, 2009; Weiss,
2010; West, 1996).

Sex educators have strived to clarify,
articulate and teach youth, college students, military
personnel, and others, ways to assure that there is
consent to sex prior to engaging in sexual activities
(deFur, 2016a). These same educators acknowledge
that what they teach is necessarily simplified in
order to help others gather a yes or no response
to an entire sexual act, and is largely aligned with
the need to prevent legal recourse (deFur, 2016b; A
look at teaching sexual consent, 2016).
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders – 5 (APA, 2013) also puts forth a
definition of paraphilic disorders, which are relevant
for this discussion, as some of the paraphilias include
desires for those who are unwilling or unable to give
legal consent. Discernment as to the meaning of
terms within the definition of legal consent is also
not always concretely clear for clinicians and is left
to interpretation and assessment in cases of forensic
and clinical practice (APA, 2013). Sexual consent
in practice between people outside of the legal and
clinical realms, however, is also subject to various
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issues such as achieving intersubjective agreement
through interpretation of meanings in the moment
and without an outside other as arbiter. It is this
process of interpersonal consent navigation that will
be the focus of this article.
What follows includes a review of the sexual
science literature on consent. This review situates
the concept of consent within the current discourse
of sexuality, behavior, and research. In order to
consider the experience of sexual consent through
phenomenological understandings, it is helpful to
first identify how social scientists conceptualize
consent. We then discuss sexual consent from
the philosophical perspectives of phenomenology,
leveraging Husserl’s ideas of intentionality and
Merleau-Ponty’s subsequent work on embodied
intentionality. We then offer a consideration of the
I-Thou framework of transpersonal transcendence
(Buber, 1932/1990) as potentially illuminating the
experience of sexual consent as a dialogic process.
We argue that sexual consent is a process that is
lived through time as a series of moments, and not
a static response given at a particular moment in
time. The way that consent is navigated as a lived
experience through time, however, is inherently
related to the structure of consciousness—as an
embodied, relational, and temporal, activity, in a
context or environment. Because a person’s lived
experience and their experience of the other and
the environment is constantly changing with each
passing moment, consent is a renewable act in each
moment—an opportunity to engage consciousness
in dialogue with the other at each moment and an
opportunity to transcend the self through consensual
sexual experiences.
Before beginning, however, it is important to
make the intentions and limitations of this discussion
clear. What follows deconstructs the meaning and
process of sexual consent and will leave areas of
ambiguity. This should not be taken to imply support
of non-consensual sexual activities, unwanted
sexual activities, rape, sexual assault, sexual abuse,
or rape culture. This particular paper is an attempt at
further understanding how consent occurs as a lived
experience. This discussion is distinct from the need
to educate others or address the legal dimension of
consent in a mechanical or applied fashion and as such
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is to be applied only to the self in a reflective manner
by way of describing the lived experience of consent
from a philosophical perspective.
Any theorizing about sexual consent should
be considered with the utmost concern for the
implications of those who may have diminished
capacity, agency, or power in any given relational or
structural dynamic—regardless of how challenging
defining these groups or experiences may be. In
addition, sexuality itself, according to Dillon (1992),
a phenomenologist who has written extensively
on the subject, is described as “resid[ing] within
a matrix of value-laden historically-situated ideas
and emotions”—all of which imbue sexuality with
meaning that is not necessarily inherent or universal,
and therefore can be thematized and questioned
(Dillon, 1992, p. 182). Given its complexity and
importance within relationships and the larger social
and structural contexts in which it resides, it is with
great reverence and humility that we approach the
topic of sexual consent.
Sexual Consent in Sexual Science Research
exual consent is an important part of healthy
sexual relationships that is gaining much
attention in public discourse—especially in the
college and university setting (Beres & MacDonald,
2015). Sexual consent in sexual science research
has been discussed as taking many forms: an explicit
agreement, a behavior indicative of willingness,
a feeling or decision, a discrete event or as an
ongoing/continuous process, something that must
be given explicitly, or even something that can be
assumed based on past behavior or relationship
structure (Muehlenhard, Humphreys, Jozkowski, &
Peterson, 2016), each with potential problems in
lack of clarity. Researchers of sexual consent have
measured consent in a number of ways (Beres,
2007; Humphreys & Brousseau, 2010; Jozkowski,
Peterson, Sanders, Dennis, & Reece, 2014;
O’Sullivan & Byers, 1996; Peterson & Muehlenhard,
2007). Throughout this discourse, there have been
a number of proposed paradigms that frame the
discussion about consent as a decision-making
process.
In a report commissioned by the Sexuality
Information and Education Council of the United
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States (SIECUS), Muehlenhard (1995/1996) examined
the complexities of consent and conceptualized it in
two ways: A mental act and a verbal act. The mental
act is described as an internal decision about the
willingness to engage or desire to engage sexually.
The verbal act is the external concrete expression
verbally to engage.
Muehlenhard (1995/1996)
ultimately recognized both mental and verbal acts
as problematic, as consent in practice is often
obtained nonverbally (Beres, Herold, & Maitland,
2004; Hall, 1998; Hickman & Muehlenhard, 1999;
Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013; Jozkowski & Wiersma,
2015; Muehlenhard, Powch, Phelps, & Giusti, 1992).
These two ideas are later identified by researchers
as two separate concepts and are decoupled from
the verbal requirement. Jozkowski (2011) and
Jozkowski and Weirsma (2015) discussed the ideas
of internal and external consent, which allows for the
process of non-verbal communication (Hickman &
Muehlenhard, 1999) externally in addition to verbal
communication. In this model, consent is seen as an
internal process of deciding whether or not to engage
in a sexual activity as well as an external process of
making that decision known to others in both verbal
and non-verbal ways. Muehlenhard et al. (2016)
mentioned that people who are ambivalent about
sex may be reluctant to discuss sex or avoid thinking
about engaging in an activity, thus making both the
internal and external processes more challenging.
This experience of ambivalence, self-judgment or
self-censure are crucial possibilities to consider
when examining consent to sexual behavior (Beres,
Senn, & McCaw, 2014).
Another model of sexual consent proposed
by Petersen and Muehlenhard (2007) considered
that the internal decision to engage in sex is perhaps
more complicated. They offer the idea that sexual
wantedness and sexual willingness are two different
issues. In their conceptualization, wantedness
is a desire for a sexual activity while willingness
indicates an agreement to engage in a specific act.
This particular model allows for the decision-making
of the subject to include many more options that are
known to occur. For example in this paradigm, a
sexual encounter can include four general internal
dispositions: 1. consensual and wanted sex, 2.
consensual and unwanted sex, 3. non-consensual
Sexual Consent as Transcendence

and wanted sex and 4. non-consensual and
unwanted sex. Jozkowski (2011) sees all of these as
internalized processes—consent being an internal
decision involving both desire and willingness (or
not) that is then made external or transparent to the
partner or not.
Consenting to unwanted sex is a rather
common experience. In one study, 50% of women
and 26% of men in committed relationships were
found to have consented to unwanted sex (O’Sullivan
& Allgeier, 1998). Consenting to unwanted sex
occurs for a number of reasons: The desire to
satisfy a partner’s needs which conflict with one’s
own; promoting intimacy; avoiding relationship
tension; avoiding hurt feelings; feeling obligated;
and, enhancing the sexual relationship (Reneau
& Muehlenhard, 2005). The phenomenon is so
common that new terminology has been coined
to define aspects of this experience. For example,
compliant sex was coined by Walker (1997) or when
experienced as a way of maintaining a relationship,
maintenance sex (Cossman, 2007; Plaxton, 2015;
Poehler, 2014).
In viewing sexual consent as having
a number of components such as desire and
willingness to engage in the behavior, Williams
et al. (2014) considered yet another component:
value or expected outcome. This is particularly
salient because one often consents to activities not
having had the benefit of hindsight to know how
they will turn out. This is easily understood by
considering the example of BDSM/Kink. Williams
et al. (2014) considered consent in this context on
three levels: Surface consent (i.e., the verbal yes or
no to engage in activity), scene consent (consenting
to and negotiating the mechanics of in-scene
communication), and deep consent. For Williams
et al., deep consent encompasses an awareness of
the deeper, unknown psychological aspects of an
activity—that will only be available to analyze and
discuss in hindsight, after the scene is complete. It
is in this retrospective analysis that the interpretation
of an activity can influence a person’s view of their
own consent, which is related to hindsight bias,
widely studied in decision-making literature on risk
and uncertainty (Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth,
1975).
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

3

Humphreys
and
Brousseau
(2010)
conceptualized consent on two continua: verbal
to nonverbal and direct to indirect. They noted
the varied ways that that consent has been found
to be communicated, including: A verbal question
and answer; smiling, pulling toward; touching; or,
other nonverbal cues that communicate willingness
to engage in sexual activity. Consent is then also
assessed by directness (referencing the explicit
activity; e.g., “Do you want to have sex with me?”)
or indirectness (more nuanced hints at an activity;
e.g., “Would you like to go upstairs?”). The more
subtle, nuanced acceptance or rejection of sexual
invitations in conjunction with perceived sexual
scripts or gender roles have more potential to
cause confusion or be misinterpreted (Jozkowski
et al., 2014). In a study of college students and
sexual consent by Hickman and Muehlenhard
(1999), responses were classified as: 1. Direct
verbal communication; 2. Direct nonverbal
communication; 3. Indirect verbal communication;
4. Indirect nonverbal communication; 5.
Intoxication; and 6. No response signals. Some
researchers argue that unless a refusal of sexual
willingness is communicated directly and verbally,
it may be miscommunicated (Burkett & Hamilton,
2012; O’Byrne, Hansen, & Rapley, 2008; O’Byrne,
Rapley, & Hansen, 2006; Starfelt, Young, Palk, &
White, 2015). Cultural and individual meanings of
both words and gestures can further complicate
understanding and clarity of subtle communications
hence the goal of educators to urge people to use
direct verbal means.
Some researchers have identified consent
as an ongoing, continuous process (Beres, 2014;
Humphreys, 2004). Consent is something given or
obtained and can be renewed as sexual behavior
continues. Signs given for a partner to continue—
termed “active participation” by Beres (2010, p. 8)
—communicate to a partner that one is engaged
in and consenting as the sexual activity progresses.
People check for this ongoing consent in social
cues that indicate enjoyment and comfort, rather
than discomfort (Beres, 2010). This process of being
open and aware to the communications of desires
in an ongoing manner is what Pineau (1989) called
“communicative sexuality” (p. 235).
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Consent communication has even deeper
components that are understudied. Researchers
have raised many philosophical issues: What of
consenting to the act one imagines will be enjoyable
and then the act is not in actuality anything like how
one imagines but is technically the act to which one
consented? Does this constitute lack of consent?
Does one consent to an act? Or does one consent
to attempting to approximate the fantasy of what that
act may be? What occurs when one is ambivalent?
For some, ambivalent desire can change (in both
directions) with ongoing activity. Even when one
communicates directly (which is subjectively
understood), what does “have sex” mean? Does it
have a contextual definition or does it require more
discussion each time? These questions and more
remain.
The communication of consent, regardless,
is a complex process. Beres (2007) pointed to the
ambiguity with which researchers discuss sexual
consent. Calling the phenomenon “spontaneous
consent,” she noted that many researchers simply
assume that there is a common understanding of
consent in the field. While the explicit definition
remains simultaneously multitudinous and elusive,
the reliance on an assumed understanding, suggests
an ontological reality of the phenomenon.
The above discussion of consent as an
ongoing, continuous process of communicating
one’s desire and willingness to engage in sexual
activity is the clearest manifestation of the
phenomenology of consent as it is lived in the sexual
science literature. Beres and Farvid (2010) analyzed
young heterosexual women’s engagement in casual
sex in the context of Foucault’s rapport à soi—or the
relationship one has with oneself. In their study, they
found women exhibited “care for the self” when they
exhibited a unity of desire and action—engaging
in sexuality when they desired it, and refusing or
setting limits when they did not want to engage in
sexual activity. Consistent with Foucault’s sexual
ethics, Beres and Farvid (2010) contextualized these
women’s experiences as acting in accordance with
their beliefs. This process of knowing and acting in
accordance with one’s internal desires in connection
with another willing and engaged other through
time, is not often discussed or contextualized in the
Levand & Zapien

embodied relationship that one has with the self
and others. What follows is a discussion of some of
the philosophical ideas from the phenomenological
and transpersonal traditions that might be used to
consider these notions of consent more deeply.
Sexual Consent and Phenomenology
exual consent can be considered through
the phenomenological philosophical idea of
intentionality, or an instance of consciousness of
something. For Husserl, intentionality is the process
through which consciousness directs itself toward
an object (in this case, another person who may
or not be consenting to sex) in the outside world,
and makes meaning (Zahavi, 2003). What is
critically important here is the idea that for Husserl,
“intentionality is not merely a feature of one's
consciousness of actually existing objects, but also
something that characterizes fantasies, predictions,
recollections and so forth and that Husserl also
argued that the intended object is not itself a part of
or contained in consciousness” (Zahavi, 2003, p. 19).
This implies that the object in question may or may
not exist in actuality and this is a critical issue when
it comes to consent. For example, if consciousness
directs itself toward an object understood as sexual
consent, this can be a fantasy insofar as in actuality
consent is not at all how the other person is living
the experience. Husserl discussed these issues by
suggesting that “all consciousness is consciousness
of something as something. In this way the matter
specifies the object as this object in a certain way.
It delivers the ‘interpretive sense’ of the object”
(Gallagher, 2012, p. 67).
Husserl also discussed active and passive
forms of intentionality. Intentionality in an active
sense, directs itself toward the outside object—
grasps objects given to consciousness—and names
them for consciousness through the interpretive
sense discussed above. However, intentionality
in the passive sense is pre-theoretical, is always
intending, is constituting and constituted by the
object it intends. Husserl described the relationship
between active and passive synthesis in a great
deal of detail but to summarize for this discussion,
he noted, “what was ‘pre-theoretically’ conscious
and objective comes ‘properly’ to consciousness
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in its own objectivity in the subsequent ‘unveiling’
reflective theoretical grasp” (1912/1989, p. 13). This
is important relative to sexual consent in that it
allows for the idea not only that one can misinterpret
consent but also that one can potentially experience
either desire or willingness but these experiences—
desire or willingness—may not even be named
for oneself in the moment and as such will not be
available for articulation to a partner if they are
passively intended.
Building on Husserl’s ideas, MerleauPonty (1945/2012) in his discussion of the
passive intentionality of sexuality in particular, in
Phenomenology of Perception, suggested first that all
subjects of intentionality are body-subjects, making
the point that consciousness is fundamentally
embodied. He then posited that all sexuality is the
“body-subject’s concrete, spatial and pre-reflective
directedness towards the lived world” (MerleauPonty, as cited by Reuter, 1999, p. 71). What is
most interesting for the current discussion of sexual
consent is the pre-reflective and embodied quality
of consciousness Merleau-Ponty described. He
continued,
Insofar as I have hands, feet, a body, I
sustain around me intentions which are
not dependent on my decisions and which
affect my surroundings in a way that I do not
choose. This isn’t accomplished through will or
intellectualization but through conversations or
gesture (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 440).
Many theorists in the sexual science
literature on consent, noted above, also discuss the
embodied quality of sexual consent that is sometimes
communicated through conversation or through
gesture (Humphreys & Brusseau, 2010; Muehlenhard,
1995/1996; Muehlenhard, Humphreys, Jozkowski,
& Peterson, 2016). Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012)
pointed out, specifically, that sexual intentionality is
not a decision that is considered in a reflective (or
actively intended) manner per se, nor is the intention
necessarily going to impact the surroundings (in this
case, another body-subject) in the desired manner.
Instead it is passively intended and existing in an
embodied and lived manner in relationship to
another subject who also has intentionality directed
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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toward the lived world in both passive and active
forms. For Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012), “[t]here is
an erotic ‘comprehension’ that is not of the order
of the understanding, given that the understanding
comprehends by seeing an experience under an
idea whereas desire comprehends blindly by linking
one body to another” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012,
p. 159). The embodied experience of eroticism as
passively intended is thus implicated in MerleauPonty’s description as separate and distinct from
the processes of deciding, reflecting upon, or
understanding in the cognitive sense.
Returning to the issue of consent in the sexual
science literature, as discussed above, the multitude
of definitions of consent as a process of deciding and
articulating to the other this decision in a concrete
manner at a moment in time are largely inconsistent
with the thinking of Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012)
and with phenomenological understandings of the
issue. The idea of consent as a verbal or gesture
of acceptance, desire, or willingness to engage
that is lived in an embodied sense at a particular
moment in time is consistent with his thinking and
with phenomenological understandings of lived
experience. Dillon (1987) discussed this issue and
argued that erotic temporality, in particular, includes
a reciprocal synchronous opening of one to another
in an embodied manner in the moment. He noted
that once the reciprocity or synchronous quality
ends, eroticism takes a turn for at least one of the
participants if not both to another meaning (e.g.,
unwanted touching, lack of desire; Dillon, 1987).
For Husserl (1920/2001), “streaming consciousness
[through time] constantly projects a protentional
horizon ahead of itself, … expectations can really
only be fulfilled through perceptions. Thus, they are
also essentially susceptible to disappointment” (p.
263) . . . and surprise. For this reason, consent to an
act (which will be ongoing as a series of moments
in time) is not possible because consciousness is
always lived through time both projecting forward in
the form of fantasies and desires but also living in the
moment in the form of experience and embodiment.
To illustrate this point more clearly, consent
to the entirety of an act includes anticipation of how
the act will proceed from the moment of consent
into the future as noted above. Anticipation is a
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different quality of consciousness than the prereflective quality of passive synthesis described
above. It is precisely this quality of anticipation that
constitutes the experience as a protentional horizon
ahead of itself as distinct from the state of embodied
eroticism that occurs in the moment linking two
bodies together as Merleau-Ponty describes. As the
moments pass in real-time from the beginning of a
sexual act, there may be a set of different embodied
passively experienced intentions, which are
sometimes actively synthesized, in each moment.
Perception brings something new … . Potentially,
the motivation can be evident to me and it can
be of a force that outweighs all counter forces;
it may even happen that no counter forces are
at work, and further, that none of them can be
exhibited in the past. But it is certainly clear
that it is a perception that first decides, and that
something new can be a slap in the face to all
expectation (Husserl, 1920/2001, p. 263).
He continued, “The ego living toward the future
also naturally experiences what arrives right at the
moment when it has become present and when the
ego actually perceives it” (1920/2001, p. 264). Some
of these moments may include in the case of a sexual
act, a dissipation of eroticism, or distractions, other
shifts in intentionality (e.g., anxiety occurs, pain or
discomfort occurs, one becomes aware of the dog
barking incessantly and this occupies consciousness
momentarily, one partner realizes they are too
intoxicated to enjoy the sex they have just consented
to, or an erection or lubrication are not sufficient)
which may be experienced as something more
like “the sex act to which I consented to in the
past and anticipated I would desire in the future is
now no longer the sex act I wish to consent to partway through the act in the moment.” It can also
be the opposite experience whereby one or both
participants anticipate specifically not wanting to
engage in sex at all but instead embrace or caress
one another and this is not experienced as erotic or
sexual. Perhaps then later they come to experience
a shift in passive intentionality as described above.
Through gesture (in this case an embrace), the initial
consent is to touch one another in what is actively
intended as a non-sexual manner, and only later
Levand & Zapien

becomes “consent to have sex” as the perceptions
of the moments that pass into the future animate the
embodied passive intentions, somewhere afterward.
Consent to an entire act, which in itself is comprised
of a multitude of many moments each of which can
include changes in feelings, desires, or dynamic
responses from the partner or the environment,
therefore in practice is only really consent to begin
the act. This consent is potentially available to be
renewed or changed each moment. Consent could
thus be redefined as the willingness or openness to
engage in a sexual dialogue through words or gesture
and could be renewed each moment throughout the
temporal arc of the real-time embodied experience.
This is most in alignment with the process-oriented
understanding of consent suggested by Muehlenhard
et al. (2016).
Buber and the Dialogic Aspects of Consent
exual consent—while being renewable in each
moment—also requires that the pre-reflective
embodied intentionality is accurately conveyed
and read by the other(s) as consent moment to
moment to participate in the same act, all the while
that intentions might be pre-reflectively occurring
for each of the participants. Here, Martin Buber’s
(1932/2004) ideas of the I-Thou relationship are
useful as illuminating dialogic engagement with
the other as a full and complete subjectivity (which
includes as Husserl would have it, a stream of
intentionality occurring in each moment). For Buber,
there are two types of relationships: the I-It, which
understands the world as comprised of objects in
space and time, and the I-Thou, which are two-way
dialogic relationships, characterized by mutuality,
transcendence and presence. Buber describes the
present, “like the eternal now of the mystic, it is the
present of intensity and wholeness and exists insofar
as meeting and relation exist” (Friedman, 1960, p. 58).
The Thou therefore, cannot be understood in terms
of its location in a reductive temporal and causal
framework. I-Thou relationships are constituted in
such relational encounters and named for Buber
the between. The between is difficult to describe
because it, like with pre-reflective embodied passive
synthesis, exists separately from reflection which
makes the between the object of reflection, and
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is inconsistent with the notion itself. According to
Buber (1958),
[Thou] … is not a thing among things and does
not consist of things. Thus human being is not
He or She, bounded from every other He or She,
a specific point in space and time within the net
of the world….But with no neighbor, and whole
in himself, he is Thou and fills the heavens. This
does not mean that nothing exists except himself.
But all else lives in his light” (p. 8).
This account of the I-Thou is a transcendent
experience beyond the self and other and outside of
time and space and as a function of deep presence.
For Buber, however, temporality and
reflection inherently come to bear on the I-Thou
experience, which is similar to how Husserl described
the synthesis of consciousness as inherently toggling
back and forth between active and passive synthesis.
Buber noted that while I-Thou relationships are
transcendent and expansive, the I-It experiences
make possible the more mundane projects of living.
“It is not possible to live in the bare present. Life
would be quite consumed if precautions were
not taken to subdue the present” (Buber, 1958, p.
34). Buber also noted that while not every other
is experienced for each I as a Thou, every I-Thou
relationship must become an I-It relationship at some
point, only to be available to return to an I-Thou at
another point in time (Buber, 1958, pp. 16-17). For
Buber the willingness to be open to the possibility
of an I-Thou relationship on the part of both parties
is what makes it possible. The specific quality of
openness and willingness to enter into a dialogue
of mutuality of two subjects is key to understanding
the issue of sexual consent as a process of attending
to the consciousness of the self and other in the
moment as the moments pass. Entering into the
between, transcending the self to embrace a dialogic
mutual space that is timeless and borne of presence,
is required so that one can attend to the moment
to moment passing stream of consciousness of the
Thou as consenting.
It may be helpful to offer an example. If one
notices one’s partner from across the table and notes
that he or she is attractive, feels desire and imagines
or anticipates a series of acts that may follow, this
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies
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is consistent with the I-It mode of relating. In this
moment while there is interest in the other, the focus
is on the subjective experience of one’s own desires
and not necessarily have the desires of the other
as his or her own subjectivity been engaged. One
might be conscious of the need at that same moment
to suspend this fantasy and put the children to bed
or tend to guests or some other mundane task and
again the I-It mode of relating makes it possible to
attend to the responsibilities of social life and home
life, for example. It is only later, with willingness that
one comes to open to the possibility of the other and
his or her subjectivity, allowing for the possibility
for an I-Thou relationship through presence that
a transformation can occur. It is this willingness,
and welcoming of the full subjectivity of the other
with his or her intentionality, that defines the I-Thou
position. And this position allows for a moment-tomoment dialogic engagement with the subjectivity
and its intentionality. It is Buber’s framework of
I-Thou that we offer here to deepen the discussion
on sexual consent from a mere process of embodied
intentionality to a willingness to be in dialogic
presence to the other as the basis for transcendent
sexual consent.
Discussion
henomenological understandings of intentionality, embodied intentionality and active and
passive synthesis when applied to the issue of sexual
consent reveal the process by which as embodied
pre-reflective conscious subjects we give consent
as distinct from decision-making processes that can
be articulated clearly and verbally. This explains
the gray areas that occur with respect to consent.
The issues of anticipation, temporality, and changes
in consciousness, between active (reflective)
consciousness and passive synthesis that is always
present, represents the potentiality for moment to
moment changes in desire, willingness to engage
and therefore, consent. Sexual consent, therefore,
can be phenomenologically understood as a process
that is lived as each moment passes and cannot be
conceived of as consent to an entire act through
time for any particular subject.
The complex issue of synchronous bidirectional consent in the moment between two
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subjects (who are also objects of consciousness
of the other), all the while that consciousness is
engaging both actively and passively, requires, if
we apply Buber’s ideas, a degree of willingness and
openness in a reciprocal manner, to engage the
other as a subject, at a particular moment in time, in
his/her/their own right. A stance that transcends the
self in this manner, as in Buber’s I-Thou framework,
is helpful for engaging the relational dialogical
space that Buber called the between even if it is
ephemeral. One is able to access the between
through willingness and openness to the other in
dialogue in the moment, as the moments pass in prereflective embodied engagement, if the other is also
similarly willing to engage. While likely peppered
with moments of I-It relationality and distraction
from the present moment within the totality of the
entire experience of the sexual act, one is always
able to renew the willingness and openness to the
I-Thou and to consent anew through choice.
While it might be preferable to have a
notion of consent that is dependent on capacity to
decide, freedom from coercion, based on decisionmaking and clear verbal agreements for the entirety
of the sexual act so as to avoid ambiguity and
problems, from a phenomenological perspective,
consciousness does not synthesize embodied prereflective sexual intentions in a manner conducive
to these ideas. The phenomenological perspective
coupled with Buber’s ideas of the between, helps
to explain why studies show that most sexual
consent is navigated nonverbally (Beres et al.,
2004; Hall, 1998; Hickman & Muehlenhard, 1999;
Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013; Jozkowski & Wiersma,
2015; Muehlenhard et al., 1992). While consent
as a decision to engage fully in an act throughout
the entire act is not possible, the transpersonal
reverence and presence to the moment and the
Thou, discussed by Buber is what provides the
transcendence of the self through the I-Thou
relationship into the between. From within this
stance mutual dialogic engagement in each moment
allows for ongoing renewed consent.
In some respects, research has identified
this concept of consent as ongoing (Beres, 2010;
Beres, 2014; Humphreys, 2004) and that some
educators and scholars have identified important
Levand & Zapien

skills needed to assess for consent in an ongoingmanner (Jozkowski, 2015; Pineau, 1989). Some
educators are also designing (Carmody, 2015) and
assessing (Carmody, 2015) programs that begin
to address these complexities, supplying skills for
seeking and giving clarity in sexual encounters in an
ongoing way. With this deconstruction of consent,
then, perhaps a greater number of educators might
more uniformly aim to focus on developing skills and
ethical perspectives that are aligned with helping
people to become willing to engage in ongoing
presence and dialogue with the other(s) with whom
we engage sexually rather than on garnering a
simple yes or no at a specific point in time. With
this phenomenological understanding of consent, a
more nuanced discussion of sexual ethics providing
deeper understandings of the responsibilities faced
for engaging with others is warranted.
Conclusion
hrough broadening the understanding of consent
to sexual activity from a binary yes or no decision
to engage in an entire sexual act, to an understanding
of consent as an ongoing, continuous process
of consciousness and dialogic engagement with
another subject, we aim to describe how consent
may be lived. We also offer a direction for theorizing
ethical engagement with another throughout this
continuous lived process—expanding the discussion
from “when a person gave some idealized version
of pure consent” to “how consent was experienced
throughout the arc of the temporal engagement with
the other.” If Husserl and Merleau-Ponty are correct
in their analysis of consciousness and intentionality
and Buber is correct in identifying a transcendent
I-Thou relationship, then the focus for consent theory
may well shift to willingness to engage the other in
the I-Thou relationship rather than willingness to
engage in a sexual act.
The consequences of consent defined in
this manner—a willingness to engage the other in
an I-Thou relationship sexually—leaves room for
many more possibilities than any of the options
offered by the current sexual science literature
and more accurately describes lived experiences
of sexual engagement than is currently discussed
in sexual science discourse. The experience of
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desire, willingness, and communication of consent
in whatever manner it occurs is sometimes
experienced pre-consciously or ambiguously and
may change over time within the entire sexual act.
For example, consent may also change as one comes
to experience real-time what one just consented to
based on how one imagined it would be in the future
but now that the moment is occurring it is actually
different than expected (either for better or worse).
Perhaps many acts that are called consensual have
moments of consent (desire and wantedness is
present and it matches what one agentically made
known to a partner in some fashion) and moments
when one uses their agency to adjust from
disappointing or uncomfortable sensations that
were not anticipated, toward more clearly desired,
and therefore consensual, experiences. With an
increased understanding of the phenomenology
of consent, its temporal dimensions and the need
for ongoing dialogic engagement with the other
as a sexual subject, it becomes possible to better
articulate and support experiences of ethical sexual
engagement that deepen connections to oneself
and others, and to allow for sexual transcendence
to Buber’s between for moments at a time. While
we have only alluded to the willingness required
to begin to enter the I-Thou, this suggests that a
more thorough set of skills and activities to engage
is perhaps warranted in teaching ethical sexual
practices. While this level of specificity is outside
the scope of this paper and would require attention
to the educational, psychological, and ethical
aspects that are also present in sexual encounters,
we believe that such a direction is worth pursuing
and developing in future discussions.
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